Future of Cross-Strait Relations: An IR Realist Perspective
Introduction
“弱国无外交” (weak states have no diplomacy), a short and popular jargon that circulates Chinese politics today, often used in describing neighboring Asian countries such a Singapore and Taiwan. A better translation is “Preferential diplomacy would never be offered to any weak country.”, which suggests that in the international arena, rather than having autonomy, small states with weak economies and military will only be acted upon. They do not get to choose their fate, and will only survive by obeying demands from bigger powers. While such a deterministic saying oversimplifies reality, and might not apply to every country and every situation, it nevertheless gives us some insight in analyzing the cross-strait affairs today.
For decades, the future of the Republic of China (ROC) has been a contentious debate for not only the politicians in China and Taiwan, but also for the average citizen. Every Chinese has opinions on how Taiwan should be treated, or when and how the army will take back the lost land. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has promoted the narrative that the little island one hundred miles south of the mainland is like a lost child to his mother, reuniting the family is only a matter of time. From Taiwan’s perspective, this could not be further from the truth. Upon its establishment, ROC embraced democracy and political pluralism, as a stark contrast to the mainland. The Truman administration in the 1950s began providing military and economic aid to the new state as Kuomintang(KMT) retreated to Taiwan. Moving forward to the 21st century, the tense yet dubious cross-strait relations never reached a verdict, maintaining the status quo has always been the leading thought from the two parties. At the 1992 consensus, also known as the One-China consensus, both parties agreed that Taiwan and mainland China are inalienable parts of a single “China”[1]. However, the specific political implication of such a consensus is in dispute, whereas PRC believes Taiwan is unquestionably part of its territory, while ROC endlessly debates about the interpretation of the agreement.
Over the decades, Taiwan functioned as a sovereign nation in some ways, but not in others: it has a constitution that is independent of mainland laws and regulations; New Taiwanese Dollar is the official currency; the government of ROC is the unitary government that exercises total control over the territory with a president recognized the head of states. Nevertheless, Taiwan is only recognized by fourteen UN member states around the world as a sovereign nation, it does not have any formal diplomatic relations with any major power, only de facto embassies known as “Taiwan representative office.” ROC’s seat was in fact expulsed at the UN when a 1971 resolution recognized the PRC as “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations”, overtaking Chiang Kai Shek government’s claim[2]. As of now, Taiwan has strong economic bonds with mainland China, but its biggest ally has been the United States, which continues to provide arms and participate in various trade agreements and economic pacts.
From a realist perspective, the future of ROC’s survival is grim: Since ascension to power, PRC’s strongman leader president Xi Jinping suggested on multiple occasions a “forceful reunification”. In a 2019 speech, he reiterated Beijing’s call for unity and warned that China reserved the right to use force to achieve it.[3] He stressed that relations with Taiwan were “part of China’s domestic politics” and that “foreign interference is intolerable”. Such a show of military prowess not only strengthens China’s image as a powerful actor in the world but also acts as a cautionary message to the United States, whose international influence has been steadily declining since the election of President Donald Trump. Without US strategic primacy in the indo-pacific region, China is now free to build its sphere of influence in East and South Asia through manipulative economic aides and military coercion.
In writing this paper, I will explain why there has been a recent sharp deterioration of relations between China and Taiwan, and how the US will face a dilemma of either supporting Taiwan’s sovereignty, or retreat from meddling in cross-strait conflict, letting China reabsorb Taiwan. I will analyze the actors from a realist perspective because it is a perfect scenario of understanding this theoretical approach. Furthermore, as China carelessly pursues power, its aggression toward Taiwan became an of embodiment Mearsheimer’s offensive realism; the US, on the other hand, represents Kenneth Waltz’ defensive realism, whose desire to achieve balance-of-power will constrain its power maximizing behavior in East Asia.
Theoretical Framework
Realism is one of the foundations of the contemporary International Relations discipline, but its true origin is ambiguous: many believe the roots can be traced back to early human writings, such as History of the Peloponnesian War, by Athenian historian Thucydides in 400 BCE. The name “realism” was coined much later in the 20th century when scholars began to recognize patterns of behavior in how states interact presently and historically. British Historian E.H. Carr remarked about such empirical nature of realism in The 20 Year Crisis: “On the ‘scientific’ hypothesis of the realists, reality is thus identified with the whole course of historical evolution, whose law is the business of the philosopher to investigate and reveal. There can be no reality outside the historical process.”[4]
The first and the most important belief of realism is the anarchical nature of world politics. The theory believes states, who are the principal actors, are living in a world absent of rules and laws where no institution is in charge of such anarchy. The lack of legal establishment in the world stage gives states the opportunity to take advantage of others without any imminent punishment, so many will strive to become the most powerful actor while ensuring others do not challenge their position. [5] Realism also assumes all states are potentially dangerous to each other because they possess offensive military capabilities, which manifest through arms, weapons, as well as individuals willing to attack others on behalf of their country. Furthermore, due to the constant struggle for security, and the fear of attack from others, states will always invest in advancing their military power. The end goal of this zero-sum game is to become a hegemon whose security will be guaranteed. [6]
In an attempt to refine the original assumptions of realism, Kenneth Waltz introduced “Defensive Realism” in the book Theory of International Politics. He doubles down on the claim that a state’s primary goal is ensuring security and maintaining the status quo, therefore he believes offensive acts to achieve power maximization like domination and force are not only dangerous but also irrational. [7] The desire for a state’s territorial expansion is only sporadic, not endemic. Since traditional realism failed to explain the collapse of the Soviet Union, Waltz’s structural realism became popular in academica, as the US triumphed at assuming the world’s hegemon.
However, 30 years later, the US-led, liberal international order has come to halt in every way: economically, politically, as well as ideologically. Its main challenger, the People’s Republic of China, has been growing its economy exponentially, while at the same time rapidly building up its military capacity. China’s desire to become a regional hegemon could be classified as offensive realism. This structural theory was developed by John Mearsheimer in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, in response to Waltz’s defensive realism. Mearsheimer reaffirms the core realist assumptions and insists that aggressive state strategies are a rational answer to life in the international system.[8] Great powers are provided with strong incentives to resort to offensive action in order to increase their security and assure their survival by nature. [9] Additionally, according to offensive realism, stronger states will likely pursue expansionist policies, which will bring them closer to becoming a regional hegemon that will exert domination of states that are under his influence.
Analysis
January 2021, upon exiting the White House, The Trump administration declassified a report that details its Indo-Pacific strategy, including “accelerating India’s rise” and blocking China from establishing “illiberal spheres of influence”. Written in 2018, the report guided the US approach to these challenging actors for the last three years. One of the objectives in the report was “Developing military and asymmetric warfare strategies to help Taiwan in its long-standing, tense relationship with China.” [11] By making the document public, President Trump highlighted the potential clash between the two states, at the same time reaffirmed the US’s strategic alliance with ROC. Not long after, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) released the 2021 Conflicts Watch Survey. A severe crisis between China and the US over Taiwan was rated a Top-tier Conflict for the first time, reflecting heightened concern over the growing risk of military confrontation between major powers.[12]
The consensus toward China in Washington has been deep distrust and animosity for years. Xi Jinping has proved himself as a lover of authoritarianism and personality cult propaganda. In 2018, The Communist Party Congress allowed Xi to be president for life and enshrined “Xi Jinping Thoughts” as one of the party’s ruling philosophies. In consolidation of political power, Xi has broken the CCP tradition of two-term limit and collective leadership, elevating his status to the founder of China, Mao Zedong. [15] Xi’s ambition is proudly displayed through foreign policy, too. His personal ethos for China’s global status, known vaguely as the “Chinese Dream”, incorporates the goal of “the great rejuvenation of the nation as a world superpower by 2049”. [16] China must become competitive against the US in every way. Part of the plan to become a superpower is to gain influence over neighboring countries, which can be accomplished through coercive economic investment and aggression. Since then, Xi has implemented various investment programs in Central Asia and Africa, numerous armed conflicts have broken out in the South China Sea and India-China border.
Beijing’s demonstration of military swagger near the Taiwan strait has also experienced a significant uptick since the election of Democratic Progressive Party President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016. Tsai, who ran on a strong Taiwan nationalism platform, has fearlessly rebuked Xi’s warning for a forceful reunification on multiple occasions. In wake of the 2020 Hong Kong protest, Tsai won a second term with the largest vote total in Taiwan’s history, reflecting its citizen’s fear of “Hong Kong today, Taiwan tomorrow”, a slogan suggesting the creeping erosion of Taiwan’s democratic identity. [13]
Taiwan’s fear of PRC is not baseless: a 2018 Pentagon military analysis indicates People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is preparing for a possible invasion of the neighboring island, as military corps are conducting long-range raid and airborne operation exercises. In September 2020, live fire drills by PLA took place during a high-level US State Department official’s visit to Taiwan, China’s Defense spokesperson accused the US and Taiwan of “stepping up collusion, frequently causing disturbances”.[14]As a champion of offensive realism, China does not shy away from using military force against other states to maximize its power. Mearsheimer predicted in 2010 an unpeaceful rise of China, stating that its past peaceful behavior is an unreliable indicator of future behavior. His prediction came true. China’s bid to become a regional hegemon had materialized through growing conflicts with neighboring states such as the Philippines and India. Forceful reunification with Taiwan is likely to be attempted as it falls under the country’s offensive pattern in the past five years. Furthermore, considering the growing trend of nationalism and personality cult within China, Xi’s recapture of the lost land will only be celebrated by the people, adding more legitimacy to his personal legacy. When “Chinese Dreams” become Chinese aggression, war is only a matter of time.
In the US, Washington will likely see a continuation of Trump era’s Indo-Pacific policies principles from the Biden administration, which is staffed with China-skeptic policymakers such as DOS Secretary Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. While the specific strategy on the Cross-strait clash is unknown, we should analyze the US intervention through a realism framework in order to best preserve its interests.
Americans’ suspicion toward China is a decade-old phenomenon that rests largely on the autocratic nature of the CCP’s regime. It is very easy for both sides to fall back into the Cold War mindset that views the relationship as the Democratic, Liberal, Capitalist West versus the Authoritarian, repressive, socialist East. However, in reality, China’s economic miracle is a paradox to many people. How could a country with such a large population of middle-class citizens and a highly open economy resist the influence of democracy? Many in the West anticipate the collapse of the Chinese Communist government as a result of capitalism, tying economic prosperity to citizen’s great, democratic awakening. Many were disappointed: the country’s economy showed no slowdown; as the world was upended by the COVID-19 pandemic, its GDP grew by 2.1% in 2020. There is continuous solidarity in Xi Jinping’s leadership, and no one within the party is posing any credible threats to challenge his authority. Departing from President Obama’s “Pivot to Asia’’ doctrine, President Trump adopted a hawkish outlook in dealing with the rising superpower. China is now seen as a revisionist power seeking to dismantle the international order of free trade, globalization, and human rights.
In terms of Cross-strait relations, Trump was still cautious, and he resisted upsetting the status quo. Despite tough talks on China and “friendly” phone chats with Tsai Ing-Wen, Trump never made any real commitment to protecting and providing military aid to Taiwan. His administration focused on China and likely saw Taiwan as a bargaining chip in the bigger balance of power game against its rival. Despite the persistent Chinese hostility in the strait, America’s silence speaks volumes. In case of a forceful reunification, the US will likely stay clear from the area and abstain from supporting either side. The reluctance to interfere in cross-strait affairs is defensive in nature because it is detrimental for the US to involve in military conflict with another major power like China at the moment. Currently, China has the second largest defense spending in the world, right behind the US: its 2021 military budget is set at $208 billion. Compared to the US, China is more advanced in shipbuilding and possesses more Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles. Therefore, to maintain its own integrity and security, the US will be reserved, and perhaps address the issue through diplomacy and informal talks.
Conclusion
In an ideal international system, every state on earth should be treated with equal amounts of respect; their sovereignty upheld; and their security guaranteed. Liberal international organizations such as the United Nations have tried working toward this goal for decades. However, to the citizens of ROC, this can only be a utopian fantasy. The exclusion of Taiwan on the international stage (IOs, diplomatic relations, etc) has robbed it of any guarantee of security. China, on the other hand, brewing with heightened nationalist sentiment on the grassroots level, is eager to reunite with the lost territory and demonstrate its authority in “domestic affairs”. The popular saying of “ 弱国无外交(weak states have no diplomacy)” perhaps will become the destiny of Taiwan. As we unpack the trilateral China-Taiwan-US relations through the lense of realism, the reality of the international system becomes unquestionably clear: states exist in utter anarchy and the only constant is the competition for power and security. Everything else is up for grabs. The false promise of alliance and cooperation, as Mearsheimer pointed out, is sometimes difficult to achieve, and always difficult to sustain.[15] Instability has become common in the indo-pacific stage as China aggressively expands its sphere of influence through military clashes. In the coming decade, as we anticipate the return of the bipolar world order of confrontation and competition between the US and China, peace will be seldom.
Citation
[1] “1992 Consensus” . Xinhua News Agency. 2006–04–05.
[2] United Nations General Assembly Session 26 Resolution 2758. Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations A/RES/2758(XXVI) page 1. October 25, 1971.
[3] “Xi Jinping Says TAIWAN ‘Must and Will Be’ Reunited with China,” January 2, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-46733174.
[4] Carr, E.H. “Chapter 5.” Essay. In The 20 Year Crisis, 66–67, n.d.
[5] Mearsheimer, John J. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 12.
[6] Mearsheimer, John J. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 12.
[7] Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics.
[8] Toft, Peter. “John J. Mearsheimer: an Offensive Realist between Geopolitics and Power.” Journal of International Relations and Development 8, no. 4 (2005): 381–408.
[9] Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 2014.
[10] Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Zach Dorfman of the Aspen Institute. “Newly Declassified Report Lays out U.S. Strategy in Asia.” Axios, January 12, 2021. https://www.axios.com/indo-pacific-strategy-trump-administration-china-377b965c-6cf8-4299-a230-c0e869bb4d73.html.
[11] “Conflicts to Watch in 2021.” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed March 7, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/report/conflicts-watch-2021.
[12] Hass, Ryan. “Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-Wen Enters Second Term with a Strong Political Mandate, but No Room for Complacency.” Brookings. Brookings, May 21, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/05/13/taiwans-tsai-ing-wen-enters-second-term-with-a-strong-political-mandate-but-no-room-for-complacency/.
[13] “China Holds Military Drill as US Envoy Visits Taiwan.” BBC News. BBC, September 18, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54200913.
[14] “China’s Xi Allowed to Remain ‘President for Life’ as Term Limits Removed.” BBC News. BBC, March 11, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-43361276.
[15] Mearsheimer, John J. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 12.
[16] (www.dw.com), Deutsche Welle. “Xi Jinping and the ‘Chinese Dream’: DW: 07.05.2018.” DW.COM. Accessed March 7, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/xi-jinping-and-the-chinese-dream/a-43685630.
